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T

he newly issued Army/Marine counterinsurgency (COIN) manual has been
met with well deserved acclaim. It is a product of our collective understanding of insurgency and ongoing experiences in Iraq. It is also the product of various schools of thought about modern insurgencies, including what can be called
the classical school, based on the concepts of Mao and revolutionary warfare.1 In
this article I will attempt to capture the impact and implications of the classical
school on the new doctrine, as well as evaluate the final product.
The classicists focus, perhaps myopically, on the glorious heyday of
revolutionary warfare in the 1950s and 1960s. They embrace the teachings of
the British expert Robert Thompson and the French officer David Galula. 2
Numerous pundits have christened Galula as the modern Clausewitz of
COIN.3 Not surprisingly, Thompson and Galula’s concepts pervade the recent Army/Marine COIN manual, FM 3-24. Galula was a serious student of
modern warfare, and following World War II spent the remainder of his career
exploring revolutionary wars, from China to Vietnam. 4 But one senses that he
would be startled by the complexity of Afghanistan and Iraq and the distinctly
broader global insurgency of the Long War.
The classicists ignore the uniqueness of Maoist or colonial wars of national liberation, and over-generalize the principles that have been drawn from
them. Today’s insurgent is not the Maoist of yesterday. 5 In point of fact, there is
not as much common ground among the “masters” as the classicists would
have you believe.6 The so-called classical principles are really a commonly accepted set of key principles and practices that have emerged over time. Some of
the classical principles are just blatant flashes of the obvious, such as Robert
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Thompson’s somber advice “the government must have an overall plan.”
(Given our experience in Iraq, perhaps this principle is not so obvious after all).
Other classical principles are not reflected in the writings and teachings of the
masters, but have been absorbed over time. For example, the emphasis on “legitimacy” which pervades the classicist’s mantra. The new field manual wisely
notes that legitimacy is best defined by the host population.7
The new COIN manual embraced these principles, along with an
eclectic amalgamation of imperatives, paradoxes, and best practices. 8 A total
of eight principles, five contemporary imperatives, ten paradoxes, and another dozen best practices are presented. 9 These various components were
given great scrutiny during the drafting process and reflect both classical and
contemporary influences.
Overall, the new Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual is a
substantial step forward. In particular, the introductory and campaign design
chapters represent fresh thinking. The chapters devoted to intelligence and the
training of indigenous forces are also quite useful. But the manual is not without its shortcomings. The classicist’s influence was a backdrop in the development of the manual. Early drafts were strongly criticized for the emphasis
placed on Mao and revolutionary warfare. A writer’s conference in February of
2006, hosted by then Lieutenant General David Petraeus at Fort Leavenworth
provided an opportunity for the wider community to comment on the initial
draft. The writing team, headed by Dr. Conrad Crane, the Director of the
Army’s Military History Institute, assessed inputs from a wide-range of experts, Iraq veterans, and international participants.
The new doctrine’s principal theme, a thread that cutting across the
modern insurgency is the appropriate requirement to “learn and adapt.”
10
This theme is ironic given the reaction that the manual received from outside experts. The manual’s Foreward observes, “You cannot fight former
Saddamists and Islamic extremists the same way you would have fought the
Viet Cong, Moros, or Tupamaros.” But the manual also inexplicably states,
“broad historical trends underlie the factors motivating insurgents” and
“most insurgencies follow a similar course of development.” 11 This Yin and
Yang tension permeates the opening chapter. The editors strove to merge the
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so-called traditional approaches with the realities of a new world shaped by
globalization and the spread of extremist ideologies. It is this necessary
merger of the past and the present that may be categorized as “neo-classical
counterinsurgency.”
The final version of the manual was strongly influenced by the classicists. For example, it is clear that the factors motivating some insurgents today are not reflected by broad historical trends, nor do they follow previously
recognized phases. Even the insurgent’s organizations are vastly different.
More importantly, some insurgents do not seek clearly defined political objectives or attainable goals. Some do not even seek the overthrow of an existing regime or control of a state’s ability to govern; for these groups and
individuals just participating in the jihad is enough. 12
How much these new elements alter classical COIN is a critical issue. A number of highly regarded analysts are calling for a substantial
reconceptualization of much of the existing theory and doctrine.13 One needs
to ask to what degree is current theory derived from this evolving landscape?
How has today’s context and landscape altered existing classical theory? The
retired Army intelligence analyst Ralph Peters has already decried the manual’s outdated and dubious Maoist foundation. 14 Another scholar from a British university, concluded:
While the new counterinsurgency field manual is thorough, serious, and stands
in sharp contrast to the political rhetoric concerning the “War on Terror” of the
last few years, it is not without failings, chief among them that it is pervaded by
concepts drawn from Maoist-style People’s Revolutionary Warfare, which is
not the sort of insurgency now being faced. 15

The published version of the field manual should have set such criticisms aside, and provided the military with a framework for the training and
education of soldiers and Marines. But the final version still did not venture
deeply enough into today’s continuing global insurgency or directly respond
to changing environmental conditions that complicate, if not invalidate, standard counterinsurgency practices and principles.

Environmental Conditions
The remainder of this article will examine the influence of these new
environmental factors and their incorporation in the development of the
COIN manual. These and other environmental factors require us to, “Rebuild
our mental model of this conflict, redesign our classical counterinsurgency
and counterterrorism methods and continually develop innovative and culturally effective approaches.” 16
Summer 2007

73

Effective COIN practices require an astute understanding of both
the history of irregular conflict and an appreciation of today’s evolving security environment. Several factors will impact the nature, frequency, and character of irregular warfare in the twenty-first century. The impact of these
altered characteristics will have a significant influence on the conduct of such
conflicts in the future.17

Trans-national and Trans-dimensional Actors
The first new factor is the explosion in the number of actors present in
today’s irregular warfare battlespace. No longer can a colonial power isolate its
colony or client state from the outside world and quietly impose its will. What
the Marines call “Small Wars” have often been multilateral or at best regional,
but if trends continue they will certainly be vastly more complicated. The past
several decades bear witness to the creation of many new states, an explosion in
the number of nongovernmental agencies, the addition of private volunteer organizations, and a remarkable increase in companies providing services and
products. Every war produces an institutional smorgasbord or mosaic of players, participants and spoilers. The COIN manual aptly describes this mosaic
and the resulting difficulty of achieving unity of effort.
The impact of external forces includes a similar explosion in the
number of news organizations, media outlets, and websites offering information and imagery. These outlets also facilitate involvement and economic
support from ethnic and national supporters around the globe. Some analysts
are extremely sensitive to the pernicious influence of the media, even accusing them of participating in the conflict, or at worst being a combatant. 18
Diasporas are another structural component and source of external
support. These globally dispersed communities, connected as never before
by improved information and transportation technologies, comprise a growing category of external participants contributing significant resources and
personnel to support respective communities. Private military or security
companies are another form of armed actor in the insurgency battlespace.
These factors dramatically increase the complexity of trying to define the battlespace. The presence of the United Nations and myriad of
regional relief agencies, coalition partners, private security forces or semimilitary organizations, several dozen media entities, and a raft of commercial
contractors make counterinsurgency planning and execution increasingly
more difficult. The operational battlespace is further cluttered in terms of urban settings by foreign “human terrain” and competing interest groups. Some
experts argue that we need to simplify the operational space through the use
of common concepts and by “licensing” participation by various parties.19
74
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Another implication of how diverse insurgent battlespace is becoming is the difficulty of simply defining the nature of the opponent, and assessing
his strategy, structure, and means. The classicists are moot on transnational
structure, and the absences of shadow governments (as in Iraq) are telling
points. Future threats may pose a range of potential organizational structures,
including traditional and fixed hierarchical structures led by charismatic individuals. They may organize into loosely affiliated networks, linked by a key individual, common ideology, or common enemies. They may elect to follow a
more cellular structure, exercising greater autonomy and less connectivity than
the old formal networks. Lastly, such organizations may employ hybrid structures, where specific capabilities or financial support are provided to local cells
in an attempt to augment their functional capability for a single mission. 20
Future opponents will not fit easily on an organizational chart. Researchers from RAND suggest that insurgents are adapting into even more
complex organizational structures and combining with existing criminal entities to form “federated insurgent complexes” with potent resources and malevolent intentions.21 Global networks and criminal financing will become
ever more prominent, a factor the classicists overlook. Recent research suggests that the temporary arrangements and structures associated with such
“complexes” may be too formal and rejected by today’s global jihadist. Their
preferred organization is even more amorphous and could be best described
as a nebula.22
Much of the interest reflected in contemporary literature in global
networks is the result of the actions of al Qaeda and its ilk.23 But this is not the
only organizational type that we should be concerned with.24 Today’s tapestry
includes traditional thugs from Africa, apocalyptic cults such as the Japanese
Aum Shrinryko group, as well as clan or tribe-based opponents in Somalia. Potential adversaries may also include former military elements or para-military
forces, as evidenced in Kosovo and by Iraq’s fedayeen. The need is acute for a
framework and the modeling tools necessary to assist policymakers and military planners in understanding these organizations, their structures, recruiting
methods, goals, and operating systems. 25
While FM 3-24 details the standard organization of a Maoist model, it
does an excellent job of providing insight on how to analyze other social networks.26 The complex nature of modern COIN and its ambiguous or mosaic
structure is also presented. What the field manual does not do is assist future
commanders in understanding how different organizations, having different
structures, operating methods and strategic objectives, may require a different
strategies or doctrinal approaches. Even highly dispersed but tightly networked groups have inherent vulnerabilities and internal factions or inconsistencies which can be exploited.27 Future doctrine should expand on these
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variations and provide a greater degree of operational approaches so to assist
commanders and their staffs in matching the diversity of adversaries with the
most appropriate strategy.

Urbanization
Numerous demographic and security studies underscore the increase in the degree of urbanization, especially in the developing world. The
size and dynamics of these mega-cities is staggering. Demographic trends
and the operational dynamics associated with a number of irregular forces
around the globe point to an increase in urban conflicts. As evidenced by the
insurgencies in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Columbia, rural insurgencies have not vanished, but the complex terrain of the world’s amorphous urban centers is fast becoming the insurgent and terrorist’s jungle of the
twenty-first century. 28 Irregular conflicts in cities are not entirely unique.
However, the frequency and scale of urban-based conflicts is becoming an
ever more important factor in our understanding of irregular war.
The rationale for this shift is founded in more than demographics.
Would-be insurgents and terrorists go where the people and money are; they
seek security by hiding among the population and within the complexity of a
modern-day metropolis. Sanctuary and safe bases were gained in the past
through distance and complex terrain, far from a government’s power center.
The classic guerrilla setting was the mountainous hideout, the dense forest, or
wild jungle. These settings offered sanctuary for insurgent forces to train and
rest. They also afforded the insurgent the cover, protection, and sustenance
required. 29 This type of cover and support is even greater in cities with heterogeneous populations, locations in which guerrillas may freely exist. In traditional villages, outsiders are instantly identified, but in a mega-city teeming
with a diverse population and high volumes of commerce, the jihadists will
not be as readily recognizable.30
Today, distance is exchanged for density. Urbanization presents an
environment with populations and infrastructure so dense that law enforcement, intelligence, and conventional military assets may not be as effective.
Dense urban centers provide the urban guerrilla or terrorist with many of the
same advantages as the classical setting, as well as the added dimension of
lucrative targets.31 Where political systems are brittle, the combination of
population growth and urbanization fosters instability and ever-increasing
challenges to political control and public security. Modern insurgents exploit
these environmental factors to their advantage.
The combination of global support from diasporas and concentrations in urban complexes has altered the usual centers of gravity associated
76
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with insurgencies. In a modern urban environment, where insurgents operate
within the hodgepodge of a metropolis, they can be indirectly supported by
criminal activities or other external agencies. This new equation may mean
that popular support is no longer as critical, especially in the early stages of an
insurgency. The degree to which an insurgent or antagonist can acquire such
support globally reduces even further the need for local popular support. The
presumption that the insurgents still seek or need popular support from a neutral mass of “undecideds” requires reconsideration.
The new field manual devotes a single paragraph to this environmental change. It admits that urban insurgencies are “difficult to counter”
because they require little or no popular support. 32 But aside from that statement, the remainder of the manual is oriented on the historical antecedents
of revolutionary warfare. 33 The manual does, however, implicitly incorporate a distinction between rural and urban contingencies emanating from
Iraq with its emphasis on public services, i.e., sewage, water, and trash
collection. Urban populations are often dependent on these services, and
key leaders have found them to be an effective tool in countering unrest and
instability.34

Religion
Another factor that has not been satisfactorily resolved is the role of
religion in today’s global insurgency. There are those who argue that religion
is an important cause or influence in such conflict. This is not a new factor in
the history of conflict; religion has played a key role for millennia. But its influence on behavior is often overlooked. Some see religion as a proxy for an
ideology, others simply dismiss it as an irrational factor. Still others discount
its influence or note that some insurgent leaders fraudulently high-jack religion with their message. Our own secular orientation often clouds the importance of this factor in modern warfare.
Religious influence will increasingly impact and perhaps instigate
irregular conflict in the twenty-first century. Clearly, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism has made religion a relevant factor. The uneven benefits associated with globalization have weakened the ability of governments to provide
the political, economic, social, and security environment that most populations seek. Some will turn to religious affiliations and ideologies to provide
these needs, and some will become radicalized by their exposure.
The impact of religion has already played a key role in modern warfare. There has been a dramatic rise in the religious affiliation of numerous
terror organizations.35 A generation ago none of the 11 major terrorist organizations was religiously oriented. By 2004, nearly half of the world’s identifiSummer 2007
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able and active terrorist groups are classified as religious.36 Religion has even
been used to inspire terrorist groups that use the tactic of suicide attacks.37 Religiously oriented organizations account for a disproportionately high percentage of such attacks. One expert concluded “the religious imperative is the
most important defining characteristic of terrorist activity today.” 38 The same
can be said of insurgencies.
History suggests that religious influences can escalate the forms,
levels, and types of violence.39 Religion appears to play a role in lowering inhibitions and reducing moral barriers to violence, including suicide attacks.
This results in more frequent attacks, extended campaigns, and greater casualties. Religious-based conflicts tend to make it more difficult to attain political compromise or settlement. Not surprisingly, religious civil wars last
approximately two years longer than the average civil or intrastate conflict,
and generate four times the casualties. 40
For all the discussion about religion, the new manual is relatively
mute on the subject. Here the classicists won again. The introductory chapter
of the manual mentions religious identity and religious extremism as a modern day influence in the ideology of some insurgents. 41 Unfortunately it offers
few indications that the classical approach to terrorist or insurgent activities
are altered at all by religious-based groups. The sole admission is an acknowledgement that “killing extremists will be necessary.” 42
Here the Maoist’s perspective pervades. The manual’s operational
approach never deviates from Galula or Thompson’s guidance. It never
acknowledges that these guidelines assume that the target population has a
value system similar to America’s, or fundamental concepts regarding political order that are consistent with that of a representative democracy,
universal individual rights, and free market economies. But if the population’s value system is not consistent with these basic elements of the US
approach, or if they reject them in favor of something founded in the thirteenth or fourteenth century, we may need a dramatically revised counterinsurgency strategy.
Economic inducements and material gains will not overcome someone’s faith or religious identity. Far too much of our theory is based on a
Western-oriented mindset that assumes the existence of some cost-benefit
calculation of self-interest. American strategists and policymakers need to
understand that such equations may not transcend other civilizations and cultures.43 Indeed, unconventional warfare theorists have noted that the traditional “hearts and minds” approach pertains to only specific insurgents, and
not to other postmodern forms of warfare. 44 America needs a better understanding of when and under what circumstances our comprehensive approach
might work and where it will not.
78
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The Information Dimension
Ideas and grievances are the seeds of most insurgencies. For more
than a decade, the security implications of information technology has been
evaluated. 45 Given that most COIN campaigns are won or lost in the political
and psychological dimensions, the importance of communications and
ideas are vital. 46 However, the new COIN manual is a bit understated in its
acknowledgement of the impact of these developments. The manual simply
states that the “Information environment is critical” and “interconnectedness” gives the adversary new capabilities, but offers only the broadest of
supporting guidance.47
Most irregular warfare theorists realize that the psychological dimension is crucial in such conflicts. T. E. Lawrence emphasized the power of
ideas. Lawrence concluded, “the printing press is the greatest weapon in the
armoury of the modern commander.”48 If he were alive, he might modify that
conclusion in favor of the video camera or the DVD recorder. Since winning
“hearts and minds” is recognized as crucial, what some are now calling the
“virtual dimension” of the battlespace may become just as critical. 49
The sophisticated use of modern information technology can generate significant support for one’s cause throughout the international system or
more directly through a network of sympathizers and supporters. It is a force
multiplier for the side capable of creating a compelling narrative in the effort
to gain and sustain an advantage. The manual notes the importance of such
narratives but then inexplicably defines the information domain as a potential
“virtual sanctuary” to the adversary, instead of identifying the virtual dimension as a crucial zone within the expanded battlespace. 50
Today, small groups have mastered “armed theater” and promoted
“propaganda of the deed” to arouse support and foment discord on a global
scale.51 There is a plethora of outlets in the Middle East, as well as, an exponentially growing number of websites and bloggers promoting their radical
visions. These outlets constantly bombarded the residents of Iraq with pictures, videos, DVDs, and sermons. The number of websites devoted to
jihadist literature or themes has exploded since 9/11, with the array of tools
going far beyond the internet.52 As Professor Bruce Hoffman notes, today’s irregular warriors have an expanded tool kit, and are not limited to:
Simply the guns and bombs that they always have used. Now those weapons include the Minicam and videotape; editing suite and attendant production facilities, professionally produced and mass-marketed CD-ROMS and DVDs; and
most critically the laptop and desktop computers, CD burners, and e-mail accounts; and Internet and World Wide Web access that have defined the information revolution today.53
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While irregular wars are quintessentially won or lost in the minds of
men (and women), the US government and the Pentagon have yet to master
modern information operations. The decision to withdraw the Marines from
Fallujah in April of 2004 highlights the powerful effect that modern communications can have on local, regional, and global audiences.54
Recent scholarship has persuasively compared the ongoing mobilization of Muslims to numerous historical parallels from the French Revolution.55 These include a democratization of communications, an increase in
public access, dramatic cost reductions in both production and distribution,
and a greater understanding of how to exploit images that create and reinforce
a particular ideology or narrative. Like the French levée en masse, the evolving character of communications is altering the patterns of popular mobilization, and having profound implications on why and how people will fight.
The availability of modern media in all its many forms has radically changed
the manner by which adversaries acquire and disseminate strategic intelligence, recruit, rehearse, and promote their cause. 56
Current antagonists seem to understand this, perhaps better than
America’s strategists and policymakers. In a letter written by bin Laden to
Emir Al-Momineed, he stated, “It is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact its ratio may reach 90 percent of
the total preparation for the battles.”57
The new manual does recognize the importance of the information dimension, but devotes just three and a half pages to the issue of media and information operations.58 Given the critical importance of this dimension in COIN,
this omission handicaps American operators in competing effectively in the
war of ideas. Of a total of 60 classical books and articles cited, only a single reference is dedicated to information operations.59 Because Army and Marine
doctrine in this arena is fairly solid; perhaps, the manual’s authors did not feel
the need to repeat existing publications. A national counterinsurgency manual,
authorized either by the joint warfighting or interagency community will not
have the same advantage. As Professor Lawrence Freedman concludes, “In irregular warfare, superiority in the physical environment is of little value unless
it can be translated into an advantage in the information environment.” 60

Potential Implications
The convergence of networked cells, operating in dense urban
envisionments, passionately inspired by faith, exploiting the connectivity
and real time intelligence of modern information technology, generates a
very different context for COIN. Galula and the classicists are certainly not
irrelevant because of this emerging context, but there is enough of a change to
suggest that fundamental re-appraisals of conventional wisdom may be re80
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quired.61 We need a more comprehensive approach and strategy that goes beyond “clear, hold, and build.” The collective impact of these environmental
factors complicates the three major and interrelated competitions that are inherent to insurgency.62 The following three sections will address how these
major competitions have been altered.
The Competition for Political Legitimacy
Currently, we define insurgencies as a violent competition between a
state and a rival political group to control a population or establish an alternative political order. There will undoubtedly be classical scenarios in which a
weakened state is competing with a rival native political group for public support and the right to govern. But not all insurgencies may see themselves as
competing to replace the existing government in a given set. These groups may
seek to paralyze and fragment the state, rather than gain control of its apparatus
and govern. 63 Also, there may not be a direct competition for the population’s
support. Since the insurgent does not require food or arms from the population,
he may not seek to coerce or solicit their support. Likewise, the limited goals of
the modern insurgent seeking only to destabilize vice create an alternative political order may not require the popular support of the people.
Another fundamental that may be altered in this competition is the role
of the population—the people may not be the prize. This is not an entirely
ahistoric idea, as Lenin and Castro did not have a great deal of popular support.64
In a global insurgency, we need to be specific in a definition of which population
we are referring to as the focus of popular support. The insurgent does not always
view the civilian population in a particular operational area as relevant to his purpose; his support base may come from a much wider global population—what
might be termed the “strategic population.”65 Insurgents and terrorists may elect
to ignore the civilian population in the operational battlespace or simply intimidate it to remain neutral. For al Qaeda and similar extremists, the pictures emanating from Iraq are not necessarily about influencing the local Iraqis as much as
motivating and mobilizing the larger movement—the ummah.
In some forms of insurgency, legitimacy may be tied to identity. In
many cases, ethnic identity or religious affiliation form the basis for legitimacy. Traditional US approaches are hard pressed to win in this political
competition unless we operate in the most indirect manner. How do we compete with a Hamas or a Hezbollah-like entity? In Iraq, the American military
must interact with identity and religious-based militias. These militias represent an alternative community formed in response to the needs of the
population. Entities like Hezbollah are very trans-dimensional, meeting their
respective community’s security and social needs. Rather than employ our
traditional “market-based” approach, we need to consider a more indirect apSummer 2007
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proach utilizing a moderate representative with the same collective identity.
Naturally, the adversary works to discredit and de-legitimize such representatives or candidates as a puppet of the intervening force. 66 This competition
for valid representatives of various groups will continue to prove more difficult to recruit and influence as long as identity politics and ethnic-based conflict remain central to complex insurgencies.
The Competition for Perceptions
Perceptions may trump or displace reality within the information dimension of a “counterinsurgency.” In the Information Age, perceptual isolation
will be even more difficult, if not impossible. Today there are simply too many
sources and means by which to transmit ideas and images in real time. The battle
of ideas has always been a central competition within an insurgency, but in the
past governments had some advantage. Now, the information technology revolution magnifies the ability of the modern insurgent to exploit any success. A sophisticated insurgent may extend his influence and maximize his credibility by
continuously flaunting tactical successes out of proportion to their actual operational effect. This is the dimension where a true competition exists; best captured
by General Rupert Smith’s analogy of rival commanders as film producers, competing with each other for the best narrative and imagery in an effort to influence
people.67 Instead of Clausewitz’s duel, the modern battlespace is characterized as
a contest between producers with stories. Combat and casualties are no longer
the cash transaction of war; it’s an exchange of carefully choreographed images
and stories designed to produce a desired effect. Rather than just the physical
consequences of a particular action, the psychological impact must also be considered. As Dr. Kilcullen noted “In the battlefield, popular perceptions and rumor are more important than a hundred tanks.”68
Strategists and policymakers need to accept the media, not as a combatant or opponent, but as a medium to extend influence or de-legitimize the insurgent.69 We need to fully exploit the cognitive terrain of conflict and “maneuver”
not only in the minds of our enemies, but, also those of allies, friends, and neutrals. Contests in the twenty-first century are inherently wars of ideas and images
punctuated with violent deeds.70 To succeed in the global arena, the United States
and its allies need to relearn the counter-subversion strategies of the Cold War.71
Operational approaches focus on the population in a physical and geographic sense. But what does it mean to “clear, hold, and build” if the central
front at the strategic level is in the virtual dimension? Should we apply the “ink
blot” concept in a broader non-geographical concept? Do we focus on the strategic population to isolate the transnational threat or target the operational population? Current theories and practices are inadequate to this task. We need to
recognize the perceptual “deep battle” of neo-classical counterinsurgency.
82
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Security versus System Disruption Competition.
Urbanization increases the difficulty of winning the security competition. It will be extremely difficult for the counterinsurgent force to establish a credible perception of a monopoly over lethal violence, especially in
dense urban complexes. The urban guerrilla has too many tactical advantages, and the history of our efforts to impose control over large populations
are replete with opportunities to create resentment or provoke a disproportionate response. Technological diffusion and urban complexity have produced too many opportunities for the urban guerilla to strike repeatedly and
effectively. The degree of systemic perturbation that this can cause, however
significant in real terms, carries with it the possibility of undermining local
governments and breeding instability. It is no longer necessary for the urban
guerilla to mass force in an effort to seize or hold territory, or to defeat on a
regular basis forces of the state. He can, however, disrupt communications,
services, transportation, and energy distribution networks at will.
Ever increasing pressure will be placed on vestiges of the state and
any intervening force that attempts to provide stability and public order. The
government’s credibility will be substantially challenged until it demonstrates it can provide security and governance. Counterinsurgency experts,
including the classicists, have long recognized that it is the perception of
credibility on the part of the civil population that must be gained. This perception is distinct from legitimacy.73 As counterinsurgency theorists have noted,
success can only be achieved when “the population is convinced that the
counter-insurgent has the will, the means, and the ability to win.” 74 Perception is the key that turns the population’s neutrality into active acceptance.
This competition is decidedly easier where the adversary, like today’s foreign
jihadist in Iraq, is an outsider and easily identifiable.
But where the insurgent is operating within his own society, he presents a difficult target. This ability to hide in plain sight is a critical subelement in the competition for security. This dilemma would not surprise
Galula, who bemoaned the government’s need to consistently maintain order,
while the insurgent had the luxury of selecting vulnerable targets at will. The
security-disruption competition mismatch can impose heavy costs on the
government, depleting resources that could be better spent on other counterinsurgency programs. Until security can be provided, and unequivocally met,
other initiatives tend to stagnate. 75
Isolation of the insurgent in nontraditional societies and megacities
may prove infeasible. 76 It is axiomatic to classical COIN strategy that government forces should isolate the insurgent from the population. Although
physical isolation may be possible it has always proven difficult, without
72
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draconian measures and significant investment in barriers and detention
facilities. The imposition of such control measures today, thanks to the
media, often weakens the proponent’s position and actually may extend the
conflict.

Conclusions
The new field manual is a welcome step forward, reflecting current
understanding of this increasingly complex arena of conflict. A few critics
continue to long for “the Roman model,” but they have misdiagnosed the actual problem and overemphasized kinetic solutions. 77 The field manual does
highlight an increased requirement for discriminate force in operations to remove irreconcilable extremists. However, the idea that such a rabid minority
justifies the requirement to “out terrorize the terrorist” abuses history and is
utterly incongruous with today’s environmental conditions.
Overall, the 1960s theorists cast a long shadow in FM 3-24.78 The era
was necessary, but not sufficient. We must do more than simply relearn classical COIN, America’s military needs to adapt old doctrine to the new and
increasingly complex strategic environment. 79 It behooves strategists and
policymakers to pay more than lip service to the notion that every insurgency
is unique. Victory against the fervent and fanatical individual who finds the
notion of transcendence through death enticing rather than forbidding, will
not be gained by outgoverning those that do not seek to govern. 80 Nor will the
solution to today’s so-called “irregular” challenges be found by laminating
yesterday’s framework into current doctrine and strategy.
In short, we need to draw upon the classical COIN principles and revise them to reflect the realities of today’s environment. The new COIN manual is the first major step in that direction; reflecting serious thought and a
concentrated effort by a group of talented people. But it still fails to answer
the most critical question: How is this relevant to the highly connected, religiously inspired, urban dwelling, global guerrilla?
We need to do more than simply study the past and update doctrine.
Institutional and cultural changes of a far greater magnitude are required.
Most importantly, the US military needs to substantially invest in the development of the appropriate intellectual skills and adaptability of its officer
corps.81 There is a recognized need for more than just new rules; there is an urgent requirement for increased emphasis on human capital and institutional
adaptability.82
Finally, inasmuch as there is universal agreement on the critical contributions made by non-military agencies, interagency shortfalls must be resolved.83 As one long standing expert has posited:
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If Iraq is a portent of the future—if protracted, ambiguous, irregular, crosscultural, and psychologically complex conflicts are to be the primary mission of
the future American military (and the other, equally important parts of the US security organization)—then serious change must begin.84

Without these changes the US military will continue to face complex
contingencies without the necessary intellectual tools required to recognize
and resolve these unique conditions. In short, we need to fully embrace FM
3-24’s operational imperative—learn and adapt.
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